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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the leading controversies in copyright law has been whether
the law can be used by a copyright's owner to prevent others from using
what is effectively protected information. A number of recent cases bring
this controversy to our attention. In Salinger v. Random House, Ina, 1
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals allowed author J. D. Salinger to
prevent Ian Hamilton from reproducing Salinger's letters in a planned
biography.2 The Eleventh Circuit supported the right of a television sta-
tion to prevent a "clipping service" from selling taped parts of the sta-
tions news reports regarding the service's clients. 3 State and federal
courts apparently have conflicting views regarding the right of the Chi-
cago Board of Trade to open a futures market based upon the Dow Jones
New York Stock Exchange indices.4 In addition, the Supreme Court in
Feist Publications, Inc v. Rural Telephone Service Co.5 refused to allow a
telephone company to use copyright to deny a competitor the right to
reproduce the alphabetical residential listings ("white pages") in its com-
peting classified business advertising directory ("yellow pages").6
These cases, in different ways, raise the issue of which standards a
copyright holder can use to suppress access to information. In Salinger,
the author was able to use copyright to assert a right to privacy that
outweighed the economic and professional interests of the biographer
and his publisher. In principle, copyright allowed Salinger to put his
privacy interest and perhaps his future economic interest in the letters
ahead of the interests of future readers and scholars who wish to know
the beliefs and events that may have influenced Salinger's writing. This
use of copyright is ironic because the letters themselves were publicly
available, having been donated by their recipients to libraries open to the
1. 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
2. Id at 92.
3. Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004
(1985).
4. Dow Jones & Co. v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 546 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The
court denied Dow Jones's request for a preliminary injunction to stop the Chicago Board of Trade
from creating futures contract markets based on the Dow Jones stock averages. However, in Board
of Trade of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d 84 (Ill. 1983) (Simon, J., dissenting), the
Illinois Supreme Court held that the Chicago Board of Trade could not institute such markets with-
out Dow Jones's permission.
5. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
6. In rural areas where the residential and classified business advertising directories are not
thick, they are usually bound in a common volume. Firms who want to offer competing "yellow
pages" directories claim that their products will not be kept and used by consumers unless they are





Even the Feist case, in which the ostensible copyright holders lost,
raises potential controversies. In this case, the Rural Telephone Service
Co. attempted to use its control over otherwise freely available residential
telephone listings to exclude yellow pages competitors from its local mar-
kets." Had Rural Telephone's right to control reproduction of the resi-
dential listing been protected by copyright, it could preempt at least some
competition in advertising. 9 However, Rural Telephone did not lose be-
cause it intended to use copyright to monopolize classified business direc-
tories by exploiting its power over the right to reproduce residential
directories. Rather, it lost on a simple issue: the alphabetical list of tele-
phone subscribers was not copyrightable because the facts were "discov-
ered" rather than "authored." 10
These cases bring to mind a potential tension. On the one hand, our
common intuitions regarding the proper purposes of copyright include
the principle that copyright is not intended to establish control over in-
formation per se. On the other hand, these cases indicate the ability of
copyright holders to control access to the embodied information to a de-
gree constrained only by the inherent copyrightability of the material it-
self,"I the "fair use" doctrine,12 and the time limitations of copyright.
13
7. Salinger, 811 F.2d at 93.
8. The "freely available" qualifier is important. If local regulators allowed Rural Telephone to
charge consumers (or "yellow pages" competitors) the monopoly price for its listings, it would have
much less economic incentive to deny access to potential competitors in the market for classified
business directory advertising. For a discussion of the relevant economic principles, see Timothy J.
Brennan, Why Regulated Firms Should Be Kept Out of Unregulated Marke" Understanding the
Divestiture in U.S. v. AT&T, 32 ANTrrRuST BULL. 741 (1987).
9. I avoid here the potentially thorny issue of whether "yellow pages" directories constitute a
relevant market under the antitrust laws, e.g., as specified most recently by the Department of Jus-
tice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 4 TRADE REG. REP. (CCI-) 1
13,104 (1992).
In Dow Jones & Co. v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 546 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the
federal court found that Dow Jones lists were copyrightable but that their value was not harmed by
any potential "copyright" violation by the Chicago Board of Trade. The court did not consider
whether the actual trading of stock index futures caused harm to Dow Jones. Subsequently, how-
ever, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the Chicago Board of Trade's futures contracts consti-
tuted "misappropriation." Board of Trade of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d 84, 89 (III.
1983).
10. Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
93, 94 (1992), citing Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1288-89 (1991).
According to the court, the alphabetical list of names and telephone numbers involves "nothing
remotely creative" and "utterly lacks originality." Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1297.
11. This includes matters such as the "idea/expression" distinction, e.g., Feist, 111 S. Ct. at
1290; Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985). Testing for
copyrightability by asking instead whether authorship can be easily and unambiguously attributed is
proposed in Timothy J. Brennan, Harper & Row v. The Nation, Inc.: Copyrightability and Fair Use,
33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 368, 377-78 (1986).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
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As Pamela Samuelson has described this process in other legal contexts,
copyright transforms "information into property,"1 ' with concomitant
rights incident to possession including the right to exclude others, extract
profits, and alienate interests.1 5
A further aspect of this tension, presented most clearly by the fed-
eral Dow Jones case and perhaps Salinger, was that the copyright holder
was asserting rights to protect uses that they themselves probably had no
interest in pursuing. Dow Jones was not in a position to open a futures
market in equity indices, and has not attempted to profit by licensing the
right to its stock indices to other markets. 16 Similarly, if Mr. Salinger's
protestations regarding privacy are taken at face value, he was not with-
holding his letters to publish them in his own biography. From an eco-
nomic viewpoint, the exclusive control entailed by copyright is justified
to the extent that one views copyright as protecting the economic incen-
tive to market intellectual property according to the creator's intent.
This rationale applies less well, if at all, to uses that do not compete with
those uses for which the creator intended to derive compensation.
Hence, these uses lie outside the context of the classic copyright policy
trade-off in which copyright grants a putative monopoly so to give a crea-
tor an incentive to create. Yet, a line may be crossed between protection
of earnings capacity and censorship. Consequently, one might argue that
copyright protection ought not be granted to these noncompeting uses
and that copyright holders have no right to suppress in those settings.17
13. Id. § 302.
14. Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a
Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 365 (1989). I say "other
legal contexts" because the two cases she studies that suggest this signal are not copyright cases.
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984), involved Monsanto's claim that the Environ-
mental Protection Agency's use of Monsanto's data violated Monsanto's fifth amendment rights.
See Samuelson, supra, at 375. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), involved a criminal
fraud case in which Carpenter and others traded on information not yet, but about to be, published
in the Wall Street Journal's "Heard on the Street" column. To gain a fraud conviction, the govern-
ment had to establish that this information was taken property. See Samuelson, supra, at 383-84.
15. 1 SMH LAW SCHOOL SUMMARIES: REAL PROPERTY 77 (1990) [hereinafter REAL
PROPERTY].
16. Dow Jones & Co., v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 546 F. Supp. 113, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
While accepting this finding, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that Dow Jones should be "en-
couraged to develop new indexes specifically designed for the purpose of hedging against the 'system-
atic' risk present in the stock market." Board of Trade of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d
84, 90 (Ill. 1983).
17. See Wendy . Gordon, The Right Not to Use: Nonuse and Suppression in Intellectual
Property 1, 54-56 (unpublished manuscript on file with Chicago-Kent Law Review) [hereinafter
Gordon, Right Not to Use]; Wendy . Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefit" The Norms of
Copyright and theProblem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1009, 1041-42 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Gordon, Jurisprudence of Benefits]. Gordon devotes particular attention to the potential suppres-




The purpose of this paper is to explicate this tension, with the hope
of better understanding its causes. First, this paper presents three ratio-
nales-legal, economic, and social-that seem to underlie the intuition
that copyright should not be used to grant property rights over informa-
tion (including all forms of intangible expression). However, arguments
against using copyright to give owners of information the kind of discre-
tion over access that owners of tangible property have should color copy-
right law instead of property law only to the degree that they distinctively
apply to copyrightable material. To see whether this distinction is valid,
this Article then examines the philosophical and economic underpin-
nings of the two leading types of justifying theories for property rights:
the "intrinsic value" approach, as most prominently associated with
John Locke,' and the utilitarian or "instrumental value" approach sug-
gested more recently by the work of Ronald Coase. 19 These theories in
turn will help us understand the economic rationales for exclusive rights
in property per se and in copyrighted work in particular.
The central issue here is whether copyright goes too far in turning
information into property. In elucidating the comparison between the
treatment of property in general and copyrighted work in particular, it
should be noted that non-copyrighted property rights are often abridged.
Owners of an asset are not always free to set the terms and conditions
under which others are allowed to use it. This Article explores three
examples of these restrictions-zoning, common carrier regulation, and
civil rights laws. These examples are chosen to illustrate the possibility
that, as far as normative justifications are concerned, the same concerns
that may lead us to question the extent to which copyright establishes
effective property rights over information may also play a role in naive
property contexts as well.20
To evaluate the exclusivity rationale's applicability in markets be-
yond those originally intended to be reached by the copyright holder,
such as Dow Jones and Salinger, this Article next reviews the "noncom-
peting uses" protection granted by copyright. In some cases, particularly
where criticism is involved, an appeal may have to be made to the hypo-
18. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 327-44 (3d ed. 1960).
19. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L ECON. 1 (1960).
20. "Naive property" here refers to the general conventional understanding regarding the abil-
ity to own, use, and sell land, physical objects, and other tangible goods. The intention here is to
refer, perhaps, to the layman's naive intuition regarding property rights. It is the tension between
this naive intuition and copyright that seems to color much of the debate regarding copyright policy.
That "naive property" is itself subject to limitations is the basis for the discussion in this paper that
the need to argue for limitations on copyright by distinguishing information from naive property is
exaggerated, at best. See infra Part IV.
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thetical ex ante contract structure employed by contractualist philoso-
phers to justify arrangements for which ex post acceptance may not be
forthcoming.21 This Article will also identify similar examples under
which an owner of naive property, e.g., a piece of farmland, has the right
to suppress noncompeting and benign uses such as incidental trespass.
Establishing that these other uses are outside a copyright holder's
intent may be easier said than done. Copyright holders may find it effi-
cient to license some particular use and distribution rights to outsiders.
The first step in bargaining over license fees will be for the copyright
holder to deny that others have such rights. In addition, antitrust analy-
sis shows that granting an exclusive license may be necessary to ensure
efficient promotion and distribution of a work.
This Article concludes that concerns over whether information
ought to be regarded as property focus on the wrong inquiry. Rather,
the concerns regarding information as property should focus on the
problems inherent in certain types of property. These problems may
arise when certain factors are present, whether the interests protected
involve property or information. This Article therefore concludes with a
brief review of how the major limitations of copyright, copyrightability
and "fair use" are consistent with a view that copyrighted work might
generally be regarded as property.
II. THE TENSION BETWEEN COPYRIGHT AND PROPERTY
This Article begins by reviewing some of the underpinnings of the
view that the burden of justification belongs on those who would support
the creation of effective property rights in information through copy-
right. The case against treating information as property may depend
upon a theory of the difference between information and naive property.
The need for such a theory, however, depends upon a clear understand-
ing of why there might be a tension between copyrighted work and naive
property in the first place.
A. The "'Legal" Objection-Copyright as an Artifact
A first source of tension between copyrighted information and naive
property is that copyright looks like an artifact. It seems "natural" to
own land or objects, and to exclude others from such use, while it seems
"artificial" to apply those ideas to ephemera such as information. In par-
ticular, the definition of property seems to suit physical entities but needs
21. Recent prominent examples include JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); DAVID
GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986).
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to be extended to fit the intangible expressions and designs protected by
copyright. This tension evolved for two reasons; the first based on the
distinction between the common law aspects of property and the statu-
tory origins of copyright, and the second based on the limitations on
ownership and alienability imposed under copyright statutes.
1. Common vs. Statutory Law
Some of this tension may arise from, or be reflected in, the differing
origins of property law and copyright. Property is based on common law
tradition, 22 suggesting that property law evolved from the "bottom-up"
to facilitate the interactions among individuals as economic and social
needs arose. On the other hand, copyright appears to have been imposed
by legal authorities upon the economy and society. Unlike common
property law, copyright has been explicitly created, by constitution23 or
statute. 24 The Office of Technology Assessment described English copy-
right law as "a statutory right reflecting its origins as a privilege granted
to government to achieve a particular public policy purpose."' 25 In short,
the distinction between common and statutory law indicates that naive
property rights are inherent in the workings of society, while copyright is
something that would not be there but for an explicit public policy deci-
sion by a government.
The distinction between statutory and common law protection may
embody an important philosophical difference that speaks to the "natural
rights" standing of copyrighted work. According to Ronald Dworkin's
theory of jurisprudence, there is a fundamental moral difference between
the role of legislatures and that of judges. 26 Dworkin argues that the
judiciary's role is to protect individual rights, 27 as interpreted according
to the best political theory consistent with the origin and development of
judicial decisionmaking.28 Dworkin has employed the metaphor of a
22. ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW vii (Bruce A. Ackerman ed., 1975) [herein-
after ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS].
23. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have power... [t]o promote the progress
of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries."). This led to a series of U.S. Copyright Laws of 1790,
1909, and most recently 1978. See 17 U.S.C. § 101-901 (1988).
24. In England, copyright was created originally through licenses associated with 16th and
17th century censorship laws, following the introduction of the printing press and the potential for
wide dissemination and copying of expressions. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF
ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 34-35 (Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) ed., 1986).
25. Id. at 36.
26. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82-84 (1977).
27. Id. at 82-90.
28. Ronald Dworkin, How Law is Like Literature, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146, 160
(1985).
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"chain novel" to describe judicial decision making, in which each judge
is to write a chapter that most understandably extends the prior story of
the law. 29 Occasionally, doing so may mean that one has to decide that
recent chapters were out of line with the overall theme of the novel. 30
An important and perhaps notorious aspect of Dworkin's theory is
that the rights that the judiciary is supposed to respect and implement
are expected to prevail over the aggregate interests represented by,
among other things, economic efficiency or wealth distribution.
31
Among the more persuasive arguments Dworkin makes in defense of his
thesis is that in hard cases, attorneys on either side argue in support of
their clients by attempting to show what moral rights are at stake, rather
than by showing what decision would best pass an algorithmic test.32
Decisions regarding efficiency or the satisfaction of interest-based claims
should be left to the legislature.
Accordingly, statutory law such as copyright is seen as a legislative
instrument created to further some efficiency or wealth interest. On the
other hand, property, as a common law creation, would find its rationale
grounded in the development and protection of moral rights existing
apart from these interests. Dworkin's theory thus supports a belief that
common law property is in some way connected with natural or funda-
mental rights, while the statutory information rights created by copy-
right carry no such credential. Thus, attributing common law property
rights to copyrighted work would give them a moral status that they do
not deserve--otherwise, we would have common law copyright.
2. Statutory Limitations on the Copyright
The statutory limitations set on copyright-the limitations on what
can be copyrighted, the right to exclude, and the length of ownership-
may support a belief that information is not property. Perhaps the most
significant instance of the first of these, limitations on copyrightability, is
the distinction between "fact" and "expression" that permeates copy-
right. 33 According to this distinction, facts themselves are in the public
domain, e.g., Bill Clinton was inaugurated President on January 20th,
1993. It is only the expression themselves that are copyrightable, e.g.,
29. IM. at 158-62.
30. Id at 161.
31. DWORKIN, supra note 26, at 197-201. This constitutes a key part of Dworkin's argument
against interpreting law as an instrument of legal policy. Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOF-
sTRA L. REv. 563 (1980).
32. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 43, 412 (1986).
33. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). See also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S.
Ct. 1282 (1991); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
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the New York Times story reporting President Clinton's inauguration.
Thus, the scope of copyrightability seems to embody a viewpoint that
information per se cannot legally be owned in the way that naive prop-
erty can be.
A second kind of limitation seemingly unique to copyright is that
the copyright statute defines circumstances under which the copyright
owner loses control of the ability to exclude and alienate. These rights
are usually central to the idea of property possession. The two aspects of
the copyright law that set out these circumstances are "fair use" and
"compulsory licensing." Under the copyright law, "compulsory licens-
ing" refers to a specifically enumerated set of circumstances under which
copyrighted work can be used without permission, with a statutory fee
paid, directly or indirectly, to the copyright holder.34 These circum-
stances include retransmitting broadcast signals by cable systems, record-
ing songs, and playing recordings over jukeboxes.35 "Fair use" is a less
clearly defined right to use copyrighted work without compensation.
Whether a use is "fair use" depends upon the purpose and character of
the use (e.g., scholarship, news, or nonprofit uses), the nature of the
work, the significance of the used portion relative to the entire work, and
the effect of use on the value of the work.
36
A third distinction between copyright and naive property is the time
limit. This, admittedly, is materially less of a distinction than it used to
be. Prior to 1982, a copyright was enforceable for twenty-eight years,
once renewable, for a total limit of fifty-six years. While fifty-six years
may seem like a long time, it is less than the time much property stays
within a family, if not owned by a single individual. Moreover, the pres-
ent value of property rights existing more than fifty-six years into the
future can be substantial. 37 However, under current law, the general
term of a copyright extends to "life plus fifty" years, with a default life-
time of seventy-five years from first publication. 38 This limits the attenu-
34. Payments for recording songs are paid directly to copyright holders. Payments for playing
recordings over jukeboxes and cable retransmission of broadcast signals are collected by the Copy-
right Royalty Tribunal and distributed to claimants nominally representing copyright holders. 17
U.S.C. §§ 111(d), 115(c), 116(c) (1988).
35. Id. §§ 111(d), 115(a), 116(b). The jukebox compulsory license now applies only if the
Copyright Royalty Tribunal determines that negotiated licenses result in a "quantity of musical
works not substantially smaller" than the amount "performed" on jukeboxes prior to March 1, 1989.
Id § 116A.
36. Id § 107.
37. For example, at a real discount rate of only 2%, $1 fifty-six years from now is worth a little
over 32 cents today. To put the mathematics another way, if someone were to earn $1 per year in
perpetuity in royalties from use of a copyrighted work, 32% of the present value of those earnings
would be embodied by the returns after the fifty-six years of expiration.
38. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1988); see also WILLIAM S. STRONG, THE COPYRIGHT BOOK: A PRACTI-
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ation of the copyright, although it need not eliminate it altogether.3 9
These distinctions between copyright and property draw out the
conflict between the common law and statute law conceptions in a some-
what intriguing way. The view of copyright portrayed here is that it is a
"but for" grant by the state, creating rights where they would otherwise
not have existed. Among many commentators, this places the policy
burden on the advocate for copyright. 40 As Wendy Gordon has ob-
served, "hostility to copyright has a long and honorable history.141 The
argument underlying restrictions on copyrightability of facts or ideas,
creating "fair use" rights for news and educational uses, and limiting
terms, is perhaps that these steps mitigate a distasteful, if not unfortu-
nate, creation of an exclusionary right.
However, these very restrictions show that copyrights are attenu-
ated when compared to naive property rights, which generally lack re-
strictions on applicability, excludability, and duration. A simple
example from the patent side of intellectual property law may bring this
out. Suppose Ms. A owns a farm, and on this farm she has a pond.
Dissolved in this pond water, for some peculiar reason, is a chemical that
grows hair on bald men. Suppose further that this chemical is found
nowhere else, and chemists are unable to synthesize it. Absent some
state action-perhaps following confiscatory legislation promoted by the
American Association of Bald Men-Ms. A has a right to make that
chemical available under the terms and conditions she pleases. In con-
trast, consider Ms. B, who owns a pharmaceutical laboratory. She
spends tens of millions of dollars and finds a chemical that cures bald-
ness. In contrast to Mrs. A., under current patent law Ms. B. has a pat-
ent with a short seventeen year life, which is granted only if she elects to
disclose the nature of the chemical.
CAL GUIDE 35-37 (1981). The "seventy-five year" rule applies from the date of first publication (a
hundred years from creation) when it is not known whether the creator is alive, or for work-for-hire,
i.e., work created by one under contract to someone else. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
39. The fraction of the discounted present value of a constant level of earnings per year of
returns earned after the seventy-fifth year remains at just over 22%, at a 2% real discount rate. This
fraction diminishes at higher discount rates. For example, at a 5% real discount rate, over 97% for
the earnings-in-perpetuity are received by the seventy-fifth year. However, it is also worth noting
that almost 94% of the earnings are received by the fifty-sixth year, so the extension makes little
difference in terms of the present value of a decision to publish. In light of the risk associated with
the creation of much copyrighted work, the higher discount rates are more likely to be appropriate.
If so, the current law, as a practical matter, renders the copyright effectively infinite, at least as far as
it would affect the incentive to create works.
40. LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 55 (1977); Ste-
phen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Com-
puter Programs, 85 HARV. L. REv. 281 (1970).
41. Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright. The Challenges of Consistency,
Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1344 (1989).
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Thus, accidental findings get a property right, while the intellectual
property claims following creative effort are, in contrast, attenuated.
Similarly, one could well view copyright as an attenuated property right.
It may be little more than the result of the technological happenstance
that it is relatively easy to build fences around naive property, whereas
copyrighted work or patents are more difficult to protect against infringe-
ment. Common law can develop for the former; only a statute can estab-
lish quasi-ownership for the latter.
B. The "Economic" Objection-Copyrighted Work as "Public Goods"
Another happenstance may help explain the economic objection to
copyrighted information as property. A hallmark characteristic of infor-
mation is that possession of it by one person does not imply that others
cannot also possess it. In this regard, we can contrast information with
an automobile. My ownership of an automobile implies that you too
cannot possess it: you can possess a different model of the same automo-
bile, but you cannot possess that particular one. This idea of
"nonrivalrous" possession 42 is the defining attribute of what economists
call "public goods," 43 as differentiated from "private goods" such as the
automobile. "Public goods" need not be public goods in the conven-
tional sense. Married: With Children is no less a public good on this
account than Hamlet. Moreover, goods like education or health care,
frequently regarded as public goods in common policy parlance, are pri-
vate goods rather than public goods in the economist's lexicon. The seat
one has in a classroom cannot be occupied by anyone else; the time one
spends with a doctor cannot be possessed by anyone else.
The absence of perfect correlation between "public goods" and the
42. Economists usually use the term "consumption," but it seems to make more sense to think
about this issue in terms of possession. The same meal cannot be consumed repeatedly, but a book
can be re-read, and a compact disc can be listened to over and over again. The very idea of
nonrivalry itself is inconsistent with "consumed" in the sense of being used up. Moreover, much of
the information many of us possess in our bookshelves, photo albums, and music cabinets is not
consumed, in the sense of being ingested.
43. The modem economic analysis of public goods dates back to Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure
Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REv. ECON. & STAT. 387-89 (1954).
Some commentators include in the definition of a public good the idea that it is not feasible to
exclude those who don't pay for using it. JOSEPH E. STIGLrrZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
120 (1988). As we will see, the ability to exclude is a necessary condition for having effective, relia-
ble private markets for any good, whether or not possession is nonrivalrous. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 69-70. However, some public goods can be made excludable. For example, to an
economist the justification for copyright is to promote excludability of otherwise nonexcludable,
nonrivalrously possessable goods--copyrightable works. Attaching the term "public good" to both
nonrivalry of possession and nonexcludability of access implies that we cannot speak of "privately
provided public goods," and it would require that we come up with another term to refer to public
goods that are in fact excludable.
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public good does not in and of itself take away from the simple economic
intuition underlying the unease of copyright. Abstracting from the im-
portant question of whether a good desired is a good desirable, normative
economic theory states that a good should be supplied up to the point
where the added cost of making it available to one more person just be-
gins to exceed the added benefit that good brings to the person who con-
sumes it. For private goods, this leads to a straightforward policy
precept-provide goods as long as the consumer is willing to pay enough
to cover the marginal cost of production. For public goods, the precept
still applies, but with some interesting wrinkles. To answer the question
of how much of a public good to produce, e.g., how many books to write,
the cost-benefit test suggests that more should be produced up to the
point where the cost of producing an additional work--creator time,
materials, space, and equipment--equals the added benefits of the work
to all of the possessors. Since possession is nonrivalrous, each possessor's
benefits should be incorporated into the calculation.
The pertinent intuition underlying the unease with copyright protec-
tion, however, comes from using the cost-benefit test to determine how
many people should be allowed to possess a public good. If possession is
nonrivalrous, the added cost of allowing an additional person to consume
the public good is zero. Therefore, anyone who places a positive value on
the use or consumption of a public good ought to be able to use or con-
sume it.44
The implications of this conclusion for copyrighted work are obvi-
ous and well-known. While the physical embodiment of a copyrighted
work-the paper on which the words are printed, the disc on which the
music is stored-is a private good, the copyrighted work itself is a public
good. According to the cost-benefit principle stated above, the best test
of whether someone places a positive value on something is to ask
whether he or she would choose to own it if it were free. Copyright, by
allowing a copyright holder to exclude those unwilling to pay the chosen
price, will exclude those who are willing to pay a positive price, i.e., who
would choose it if it were free, but are not willing to pay the copyright
holder's price. If there are such persons-and there need not be--copy-
right results in too little access to the copyrighted product.
44. There are middle cases between complete rivalry, e.g., a hamburger, and complete
nonrivalry, eg., a broadcast signal. Use of a bridge or park may be almost nonrivalrous, but such
use may impose costs on others due to congestion or the distraction of having others around. In
such cases, access to the public good may be conditioned on paying a fee equal to the costs of
congestion. RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC




This obviously does not imply that elimination of copyright would
make the world a better place. Creators are far less likely to create copy-
rightable works if they cannot be compensated for their time and trouble.
However, it does explain why copyright, and the concomitant treatment
of copyrighted information as property, could be viewed as at best a nec-
essary evil.
45
C. The "Social" Objection-Copyrighted Work in the Public Good
The economic objection Was based upon the attributes that make
information a "public good" in the economist's technical sense. An addi-
tional set of objections is based upon the more familiar sense of public
good, as goods and services that contribute to making the polity and soci-
ety better.46 Freely disseminated information has been viewed as just
such a public good. This view can be traced to the founding fathers of
the United States. They were concerned that the public interest in infor-
mation should not be treated as property, motivated by the belief that
unfettered access to information would "promote technological and eco-
nomic progress" and be "an essential step in building the fledgling na-
tion."'47 A recent report by the Office of Technology Assessment
highlights three arenas in which information dissemination contributes
to the public good-the political, the cultural, and the individual. 48 Each
of these three areas could be adversely affected by the ability of copyright
holders to limit access to their works, whether motivated by profit or
personal predilection.
45. A perhaps more interesting possibility is that creators of copyrightable work might still be
compensated even in the absence of formal copyright protection. For suppliers of unauthorized
copies to survive, the price must cover both the marginal cost of producing copies and the fixed costs
involved in setting up a copying operation. Since those suppliers will be competing against the
original creator who has already sunk its original creation costs, it is possible that the competitive
price might be insufficiently above the marginal cost of making copies to cover the copier's fixed
costs of entry. If this is a rational expectation-which depends upon both the expected intensity of
competition and the size of the fixed costs of entry--copiers would not enter, even without the
potential force of copyright sanctions. Brennan, supra note 11, at 375-76.
46. An important philosophical issue, not to be taken up here, is the extent to which there is a
"public interest" apart from the possession and consumption available to each of the individuals in
the public. Advocates of allowing economic markets to determine broadcast content have argued
that "the public's interest, then, defines the public interest." Mark S. Fowler & Daniel L. Brenner, A
Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEx. L. REv. 207, 210 (1982). We need assume,
for purposes of this discussion, only that there can be norms of judging the performance of political
and cultural institutions beyond whether they respond to private willingness to pay. In any case, for
purposes of this article, it is necessary only to find that there is widespread resistance to allowing
copyright to create property rights in information based upon these social concerns. Whether this
resistance is in all cases reasonable is a debate for another venue.
47. Samuelson, supra note 14, at 371-72.
48. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, CRITICAL CONNECTIONS: COM-
MUNICATION FOR THE FUTURE 145, 181, 211 (1990) [hereinafter CRITICAL CONNECTIONS].
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The primary political role of information is in ensuring that the elec-
torate is sufficiently informed to make judgments regarding the current
and prospective performance of their governmental institutions. Much
of the support for the First Amendment protection of freedom of speech
springs from its protection of political speech,49 and the ability to get
information depends on the ability to send information. To the degree
copyright converts politically relevant information into excludable prop-
erty, it allows the owners of that information to condition access to that
information on the receivers' willingness to pay or, perhaps more insidi-
ously, on the receivers' prior political viewpoint. The "fair use" excep-
tion for news-related uses" follows from the premise that such
restriction would be detrimental to society.
A second aspect of access to information is its effect on a society's
culture. Copyrighted works-literature, music, films, graphic arts-are,
with political, ethnic, and religious institutions, the defining components
of a culture. Treating these as property essentially means that these de-
fining components, and our culture as whole, can be owned with the per-
quisites of buying, selling, and excluding. Not only do these cultural
aspects define our society, they also are part of what comes to define our
own personalities and aspirations.51 Copyright law reflects these con-
cerns to only a small degree, through the limited "fair use" exemption for
educational uses.
III. THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROPERTY52
A. The Unease
At one level, the discomfort associated with treating copyrighted
work as proprietary information rests on distinctions between the two.
On the other hand, this unease may be an extension of the suspicion that
nothing should be so treated. As with so much else, Shakespeare proba-
49. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989); ARCHIBALD COX, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
2-4 (1981); JOHN STUART MILL, UTILrrAR ANISM AND OTHER WRITINGS 175 (Meridian 1965).
50. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (Supp. 1992).
51. The potential effect of cultural symbols and artifacts on desires and aspirations is a distinct
effect from the economist's "public good." For the economist, a public good is defined and evaluated
according to the preferences of persons as given. Cultural artifacts are also important because they
change those preferences. Where such preference change is predictable, standard economic effi-
ciency norms do not apply. Timothy J. Brennan, Economic Efficiency and Broadcast Content Regu-
lation, 35 FED. COMM. L.J. 117, 131 (1983). Among other consequences, this argument has led
some economists to rescue those norms by claiming that apparent preference change-based behavior
really is an effect of changes in information available to agents whose underlying preferences remain
constanL George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 Am. ECON.
REv. 76 (1977).
52. Much of this section is drawn from Timothy J. Brennan, First Amendment Rights and
Property Rights (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Chicago-Kent Law Review).
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bly best described the nature of the feelings many have as to how good
the world would be but for the protection of property under the law. In
the following excerpt from Henry VI, 53 Jack Cade, Dick the Butcher, and
other rebels against the king are discussing their goals. One of the lines
in this excerpt is familiar (perhaps painfully) to many lawyers, but the
less well-known context is of primary interest here.
CADE Be brave, then; for your captain is brave, and vows reformation.
There shall be in England seven halfpenny loaves sold for a
penny: the three-hooped pot shall have ten hoops; and I will make
it a felony to drink small beer: all the realm shall be in common;
and in Cheapside shall my palfrey go to grass: and when I am
king, as king I will be-
ALL God save your majesty!
CADE I thank you, good people: there shall be no money; all shall eat
and drink on my score; and I will apparel them all in one
livery, that they may agree like brothers and worship me their
lord.
BUTCHER The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers.
CADE Nay, that I mean to do. Is not this a lamentable thing, that of
the skin of an innocent lamb should be made parchment? That
parchment, being scribbled o'er, should undo a man? Some say
the bee stings: but I say 'tis the bees wax; for I did but seal
once to a thing, and I was never mine own man since.
54
This excerpt sets out the utopian view of a property-less society. When
"all the realm" is common, prices would fall, there would be no need of
money, and plenty of food, drink, and apparel would be available for
everyone-so much that drinking only "small beer" would be a felony.
It is only the parchment, enforced by the lawyers, that undoes men.
The proponent of property has always had the burden of justifying
an individual's right to threaten exclusion and demand payment. One
obvious tactic is to attempt to subvert the issue by claiming that the vices
of property would not be so bad if it were more evenly or justly distrib-
uted. This is a tack taken by both utilitarian and egalitarian propo-
nents,55 as well as recent contractarian theory.5 6 However, these theories
53. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 4, sc. 2, in
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE: THE COMPLETE WORKS 476, 500-01 (Alfred Harbage ed., 1969).
54. Id.
55. If all persons have the same utility of owned wealth, and the marginal utility of wealth falls
as wealth increases, the utilitarian prescription is equal wealth distribution. A way to achieve this
result, recognizing that persons may have different tastes in terms of how they would elect to con-
sume their wealth, would be to let them freely trade with one another once resources have been
distributed. Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB.
AF. 283, 286 (1981).
56. Subject to a guarantee of liberty for all, John Rawls would distribute primary goods so as to
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do not address the institution itself, they only excuse it.
Two leading classes of theories have been offered to justify prop-
erty--"intrinsic value" theories, particularly that of John Locke,57 which
defend the value of property arrangements in and of themselves, and "in-
strumental value" theories, particularly those recently based on the work
of Ronald Coase,58 that justify property as a means to an independently
valued end.
B. The "Intrinsic Value" Justification
A theory of property is something that provides ethical justification
for "A owns X." Classical theories of property treat "A owns X" as a
primitive fact to justify on moral grounds. These theories attempt to ex-
plain why A should get all the rights of control, exclusion, and sale that
come with owning X. In these classical theories, such as Locke's, 59 the
question of whether A should own X is treated as one of intrinsic merit
or A's desert. The answer to the question is based on the idea that A is
entitled to appropriate the fruits of his labor.60 A should own X if X
would not be there without A's doing. A has a prima facie moral right to
his person and, in a sense, X is an extension of the self. Allowing A to
own X preserves intrinsically valuable considerations of integrity, auton-
omy, and survival.
61
A justification of copyright follows from this classical defense of
property rights. As James Ely says, "It is difficult to overstate the impact
of the Lockean concept of property" in the colonial development of con-
stitutional law,62 which, as noted above, includes explicit mention of in-
tellectual property protection. Assume that property ownership is
justified by the argument that the property is an extension or embodi-
maximize the welfare of the least well-off class of individuals. RAWLS, supra note 21, at 152-54.
This theory is based upon a theoretical "original position" contract among individuals behind a "veil
of ignorance" who do not know whose life they would end up leading. Id. at 118, 136. Rawls
argues, in effect, that since we only have one life to lead, we would be maximally averse to risk in the
"original position," and thus would structure social institutions to limit how badly off we could end
up, however unlikely that might be. Id at 154.
57. LOCKE, supra note 18. For a recent thorough philosophical survey of property theory cov-
ering Locke in detail, as well as theories from Robert Nozick and G.W.F. Hegel, see JEREMY WAL-
DRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1990).
58. Coase, supra note 19, at 1.
59. I apologize for the oversimplification here. I do not mean this to be in any way an authori-
tative treatment of Locke's property theory or the philosophical tradition in which it lies. For a
thorough survey and appraisal of Locke's theory, see WALDRON, supra note 57, at 137-252.
60. Id at 173, 184.
61. Locke's natural rights justification for property rights against the state also had a theologi-
cal foundation. Id. at 143-47.
62. JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RGHT 17, 29 (1992), citing the
influence of Locke on Jefferson in drafting the Declaration of Independence.
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ment of the self. The corollary justification for copyright would be that
the intrinsic value of the self or one's autonomy would be violated with-
out the ownership of one's creations; the ability to create is one of the
fundamental activities that defines or constitutes the self.63
Many steps in this chain of reasoning may be subject to criticism,
but I want to focus on the initial premise that the classical property justi-
fication is sound and applicable. It is no accident that the stories used to
support the classical theory are pastoral and agrarian. The image is of an
unskilled farmer collecting apples from a tree or plowing a field. In such
a world, there is no meaningful joint production combining contributions
from many persons to make goods and service. There is no ambiguity in
deciding who is responsible for a particular piece of property being
created.
In contrast, try to determine on a classical account whose property
is this article. Is it mine? The publisher's? The printer's? Does it belong
to Microsoft or Apple, without whose efforts this paper would not be
here? How about all the colleagues cited above who gave me their ideas?
To be post-modernist, perhaps the article belongs to you because you
provide its context and, by reading and commenting, provide meaning.
One possible resolution might be to say that in a complex world, prop-
erty is inevitably joint. However, joint property cannot be defended eas-
ily as an extension of the self, without straining the intrinsic values of
integrity and autonomy that justify granting the right in the first place.
We are left to conclude that on the classical account, property rights
are either underdetermined-there exist objects without clear owners-
or overdetermined-there exist objects with too many claimants to own-
ership. This very ambiguity, I think, explains the popularity of classical
property theory among reformers. If the classical theory is the only po-
tentially reasonable theory of property, and if it explains so little of our
current property rights structure, then the distribution of property rights,
if not the institution of property itself including intellectual property, is
politically up for grabs.
Two potential limitations of property rights in Locke's account may
be relevant here. While he does believe in rights to property in which
one's labor is mixed, the rights are not unqualified. Waldron identifies
two important restrictions on that right. The first, called the "spoliation
proviso," is that a property right to an object is lost if one does not "use"
63. It is in exactly this sense that the standard, usually unanalyzed, presumptive case in First
Amendment analysis is not the "print" model, but rather the "throat" model. Owning a media asset
implies unlimited speech rights because the asset is an extension of one's throat.
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the object. Specifically, Locke says that a right to property may extend
to "[a]s much as any one can make use of any advantage of life before it
spoils; so much may he by his labor fix a Property in. Whatever is be-
yond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others." 64 While "use"
may be broadly construed as providing "utility" in the economist's sense,
including pure pride of ownership for its own sake, we might presume
that Locke had something more substantive in mind. This, however,
may call into question the right to harbor either naive property or copy-
righted work, be it out of privacy or pique.
The second potential qualification Waldron identifies in Locke is
that one's right to property may be limited if full rights would keep
others from reaping the fruits of their labor.65 Gordon has noted this
qualification in applying Locke's theory to intellectual property rights.6"
This constraint could provide philosophical justification for public access
policies such as "fair use." If so, rights in particular commodities might
merit some attenuation to ensure that the public has an ethically proper
opportunity to use particularly important copyrighted work or
information.
It is important to note that not all philosophers support this inter-
pretation. While quoting Locke--"For he that leaves as much as an-
other can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all," 67-Waldron
finds that Locke's text does not support limiting property claims when
there is not "as much as another can make use of."68 However, unless
we can extend Locke's theory of property, as based on the embodiment
of the individual's labor, to a society based on collective production, this
question is moot.
C. The "Instrumental Value" Counterargument
The problems with justifying property and its attendant privileges
through the intrinsic value theories have led to other theories. A second
contending theory of property, based on the view that property, as an
institution, facilitates persons' abilities to secure efficiency by providing
the excludability and alienability necessary for consensual transactions,
64. LoCKE, supra note 18, at 308, 318; see WALDRON, supra note 57, at 207.
65. LocKE, supra note 18, at 309; see WALDRON, supra note 57, at 209-10.
66. Gordon, supra note 10, at 102-03.
67. WALDRON, supra note 57, at 208-16.
68. Id Waldron observes that perhaps a property owner has an obligation to be charitable it
others are deprived, but the property rights themselves remain legitimate. Id. at 215. But see Wendy
J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L. J. 1533 (1993).
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was developed by Coase. In The Problem of Social Cost,69 Coase pointed
out that market failures were the result of the inability to charge costs
and reward benefits through market exchange. Once alienable property
rights were defined, people could achieve jointly beneficial outcomes un-
less transaction costs make collective resolution prohibitive. If the distri-
bution of property rights has no effect on how a person values the
relevant outcomes, the outcomes will be identical regardless of how the
rights are distributed. This latter observation has come to be known as
the "Coase Theorem."
The theory of property suggested by Coase's work differs from the
classical conception in two important and related ways. First, the rele-
vant question not only asks why a particular person should own X, but
also asks why anyone should own X. Coase justifies property not by the
claims of the property holder but by the worth of property rights them-
selves. Second, and consequently, the justification for property is not
grounded in the intrinsic value of its relationship to the owner. Property
is necessary for instrumental reasons: it enables people to move owner-
ship around until all mutually agreeable outcomes have been reached.
Consequently, the Coase analysis is not subject to the moralistic turn in
the classical conception of property. Moreover, the Coase argument does
not lead to the ambiguities in ownership claims that the classical theory
leads to when production is collective.
The economic justification for property leaves aside the question of
how property rights should be distributed among the members of society,
that is, who should get what. At least three considerations help fil that
rather significant blank. The first recognizes that transaction costs may
not be insignificant. If transaction costs are significant, the ability of peo-
ple to reach mutually beneficial outcomes may be affected by granting
property rights in one way or the other.70 Moreover, even if mutually
beneficial outcomes could be achieved, transaction costs could be avoided
if the outcome is anticipated by the initial allocation of rights rather than
69. Coase, supra note 19. Excerpts from some of the leading defenses of property theory along
the lines set out by Coase are presented in ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS, supra note 22, at 1-50.
70. Stanley M. Besen et al., Copyright Liability for Cable Television: Compulsory Licensing and
the Coase Theorem, 21 J.L. ECON. 67 (1978), applies this principle in developing a criticism of the
compulsory license for broadcast retransmission. They point out that if transaction costs were negli-
gible, cable systems and broadcasters would set up elaborate rebate or surcharge schemes just in case
the compulsory license fee differed from what the market price would be absent the license. For
example, if the license fee were $2 and the market price for retransmission were $3, a station could in
principle threaten to go out of business unless the cable system paid it the extra dollar. The very fact
that transactions, including both the threat/counteroffer process and the administration of penalties
or rebates, are costly is what makes controlling price at a level apart from the market price ineffi-
cient. For a summary of this argument, see Brennan, supra note 11, at 380-81.
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by requiring persons to bargain and exchange. Therefore, legal or prop-
erty rights can be defined to anticipate the outcomes that would have
transpired had transaction costs been negligible. We can call this the
efficiency justification for assignment of property rights.
A second consideration follows from the recognition that while out-
comes may be independent of the allocation of property rights in an ideal
world of costless transactions, the distribution of wealth will not be.
Who gets to charge, and who has to pay, is very much determined by the
structure of property rights. We may want to assign property rights to
ensure that criteria of distributive justice are met or that wealth inequal-
ity is minimized. We can call this the equity justification.
Third, the ethical justification of the Coase property framework de-
pends upon the ethical permissibility of exchange, often because doing so
would violate a moral right.71 It may be that some objects should not be
up for sale. For example, in our society it is widely recognized that
slaves, babies, and political votes are inalienable. More controversial po-
tential inalienabilities include blood donation, education, and surrogate
motherhood.72
The efficiency, equity, and moral rights considerations that affect
property ownership could be used fruitfully to study assignment of copy-
right in relatively marginal situations. These situations include issues
such as work-for-hire or the "moral rights" issue associated with
whether, for example, films can be colorized without the director's con-
sent even if the director is no longer the copyright holder.7 3 With regard
to the assignment of copyright, the initial creator is the most likely agent
to see that her creation is put to its most valued use.74 Perhaps it would
be more cautious and accurate to say that there is no systematic way to
reassign rights away from the creator that would lead to better uses or
reduce transaction costs. A prospective copyright holder of some pro-
71. The connection between moral rights and the immorality of alienation is discussed in
Timothy J. Brennan, The Fairness Doctrine as Public Policy, 33 . BROAD. ELEC. MEDIA 419, 422-26
(1989), and is set out in Timothy J. Brennan, Rights as Inalienable (unpublished manuscript, on file
with Chicago-Kent Law Review) [hereinafter Brennan, Rights as Inalienable]. The term "moral
rights" here is used in the philosopher's sense, not the copyright specialist's. Whether there is a
connection between the idea that the philosopher's moral rights entail inalienability and the copy-
right moral right that essentially prevents a creator from alienating the right to modify a work
against her wishes is a question deserving some further work. Id. at 19-20.
72. Brennan, Rights as Inalienable, supra note 71, at 16-19.
73. David J. Kohs, Paint Your Wagon-Please: Colorization, Copyright, and the Search for
Moral Rights, 40 FED. COMM. L.J. 1 (1988).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 135-42 for a discussion of how fair use could be justified
as an exception to this rule.
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spective work other than the creator would have to devise a way to find
the creator and pay her to get that prospect realized.
Insofar as property is valuable in providing the conditions for value-
maximizing exchange, copyright likewise can be justified to the extent
that it is defined to work as property does. We have seen, however, that
copyright appears to be treated in ways systematically different from
property under the law.75 Whether this compels us to regard copyright
differently from naive property depends on whether property rights are
modified like copyright in non-copyright settings.
IV. COPYRIGHT-LIKE TENSIONS IN NAIvE PROPERTY SETTINGS
As discussed in Part II, the tensions between copyright and property
can be attributed to three core objections. The legal objection is based
upon the statutory origins of copyright and the limitations on applicabil-
ity, excludability, and duration in copyright. The economic objection is
based on the "public good" nature of copyrighted work, which leads to
the conclusion that copyright work will be made available at an inef-
ficiently high price. The social objection is based on the idea that treat-
ing copyrighted work like property grants exclusive control to material
crucial to the functioning of our political systems and the development of
our culture and our selves. However, these three objections require us to
conclude that it is inherently wrong to regard copyright as granting
property rights in information only if naive property could not be modi-
fied, as is copyright, to take these considerations into account when they
apply in non-copyright contexts. The opposite, however, appears to be
the case.
,4. The Legal Objection, Reconsidered
The first legal objection to conveying property status to copyrighted
work is formal-copyright is a product of statute, whereas property is a
product of common law. According to Ronald Dworkin's legal theory, a
consequence of this distinction is that property law will tend to respect
rights more, whereas statutory law will tend to promote interests.
Interestingly, economists have often taken a diametrically opposed
view.76 The common law tends toward efficiency, on the economic ac-
count, because over time the most valuable outcome will be reflected in
the relative expense and effort devoted toward common law litigation.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 22-51.
76. For a useful survey of the literature, see Paul H. Rubin, Common Law and Statute Law, 11
J. LEGAL STuD. 205, 206 (1982).
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On the other hand, the legislative processes producing statutes tend to
respond to the salient interests of particular supplicants without the rule-
based constraints facing judges. If this distinction is valid, it suggests
that the common law tends toward value maximization, leaving the issue
of particular protection to the legislature, rather than the other way
around. The fact that plausible arguments regarding the distinctions be-
tween common and statutory law move in opposite directions indicates
that the meaning of any distinction in the origins of copyright and of
property law is not clear or compelling.
Rubin adds three other arguments that raise questions about the
pertinence of the distinction.77 First, he reviews a variety of statutes that
have played a role in property law, including instituting fee simple land
tenure, allowing women to sell land, and creating homestead rights in
public lands. Second, citing Tullock,78 he points out that the economic
forces supposedly causing the common law to be efficient-that gainers
would tend to outspend losers-would be expected to influence legisla-
tion over time as well. Third, citing Epstein,7 9 he surveys developments
in the common law that at least appear as inefficient as statutory interfer-
ence in free exchange. These all suggest that copyright work and prop-
erty ought not to be kept distinct simply because of their origins.
The second legal objection to treating copyrighted work as property
is more substantive-that copyright law has characteristic attenuations
on ownership that property law lacks. These attenuations impose limita-
tions on copyrightability, alienability, and duration. However, property
law is itself subject to similar restrictions. With respect to scope, the
public can designate land, air, water, or other resources (e.g., citizens
band radio spectrum) as property common to all. Alienability restric-
tions are embodied by, among other things, zoning laws which forbid
some land owners from making land available for particular uses. Prop-
erty law even has duration restrictions of sorts, embodied in statutes of
limitations permitting adverse possession80 or the rule against perpetu-
ities3 1 These examples do not necessarily show that property law is effi-
cient, or, in the case of the rule against perpetuities, comprehensible.
77. Id at 207-11.
78. Id. at 207 n.4 (citing GORDON TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL (1980)).
79. Id. at 209 n.10 (citing Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.
L. EcoN. 293 (1975)).
80. EDWARD H. RABIN & ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN
REAL PROPERTY LAW 736 (1992).
81. Id. (3d ed. 1992) at 194-206. The rule against perpetuities invalidates interests in property
that do not vest within twenty-one years, plus a period of gestation, after some life or lives in being at
the time of creation of the interest. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1195 (5th ed. 1979).
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They do show that property can be modified in copyright-like ways with-
out requiring that the objects in question be regarded as something other
than property.
B. The Economic Objection, Reconsidered-Public Utility Regulation
The second class of objections to interpreting copyright as granting
a property right over information is based on the economics of public
goods. Where effective, exclusionary rights govern public goods, a posi-
tive price to each user, and perhaps for each use, will exceed the zero
marginal cost associated with additional users or uses. Information,
apart from the tangible media used to carry it, is the quintessential public
good. Thus, the quasi-property right granted by copyright over creations
and expressions prevents the efficient distribution of access to copy-
righted works.
As noted above, forcing copyright holders to make their work avail-
able at the efficient price would result in no payments for copyrighted
work. Thus, the only work we would have would be that which creators
would provide for free. The prevailing alternative, however, is to grant
an unrestricted monopoly over the copyrighted work, the seemingly logi-
cal outcome of electing to treat copyrighted work as naive property.
However, there are numerous contexts involving naive property in which
the government prevents the selling price from reaching the monopoly
level. The policy goals underlying this regulation are mitigating the inef-
ficient incentive to withhold output in order to raise prices and profits,
preventing an inequitable redistribution of wealth, and ensuring that in-
dividual rights of participation in, or access to, social networks are not
infringed.
2
One such context is public utility regulation, e.g., control of local
telephone rates. Such industries are typically characterized by "natural
monopoly" conditions, that is, one firm can supply the product to an
area at less expense than two or more dividing the market among them-
selves.83 For example, the investment of a second firm in installing local
electrical transmission lines, sewer systems, natural gas pipes, or tele-
phone distribution networks would be largely redundant; one of those
82. It should be acknowledged that this is a somewhat Pollyannish view of public policy. Many
students of regulatory processes find that they are at least as likely, if not more likely, to be a predict-
able means of ensuring that prices are kept high, inequitable incomes preserved, and individual
rights infringed. RIGHTS AND REGULATION (Tibor Q. Machan & M. Bruce Johnson eds., 1983);
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, in THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE 114 (1975);
Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. MGMT. Sci. 22 (1971).
83. WILLIAM W. SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 58 (1982).
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networks can satisfy demand. Where the redundancy costs are great, the
market will typically end up with only one monopoly provider. If con-
sumers are willing to pay a great deal for the commodity, this monopoly
will be able to charge high prices while enriching itself and impoverishing
the consumers in the process. To prevent this outcome, the public may
regulate the fees charged to bring them more into line with the actual
costs of providing the service and to mitigate the inefficient stifling of
demand associated with charging high prices.84
If regulation is to be administered effectively, the regulator must
have some idea what the right price is, taking both consumer demand
and production cost into account. In the traditional markets where pub-
lic utility regulation has been implemented-water, natural gas distribu-
tion, electricity, local telephone service-the products are relatively
simple and homogeneous, making production cost estimates possible. In
addition, demand for these commodities is fairly insensitive to price,
making quantity predictions, cost estimates, and tariff calculations feasi-
ble. Whether such regulation is at all feasible for copyrighted works,
with widely varying characteristics, demands and production costs, is ex-
tremely doubtful at best.85
The point, however, is not that regulation should be instituted for
copyrighted works.86 Rather, it is that limiting the extent to which own-
ers can charge inordinately high prices for their property is consistent
with regarding copyrighted works as property. One could therefore im-
pose such regulations on copyrighted work, in principle, without electing
to deny property status to that work. The reason we do not do so is not
84. Whether such regulation should actually set prices directly on the basis of costs or allow
prices to diverge from costs after some initial date is a continuing policy question. Timothy J. Bren-
nan, Regulating by Capping Prices, I J. REG. ECON. 133 (1989).
85. A substitute for regulation is public provision, where the product is supplied at a price
equal to marginal production cost and other costs are covered by tax revenues. The decision of a
government to provide copyrightable work, e.g., data tables and policy reports, and the policy not to
grant the government a copyright on the work, could be interpreted as the designation of a set
copyrightable works that should be supplied to the public at prices below market-determined levels.
86. In the economic literature on patents, some theoretical results suggest that the policy that
maximizes net economic benefit while ensuring a given level of expected profit to an inventor would
be to have a patent of infinite duration, with a regulated license fee. In other words, the economy is
better off by trading a longer license for a limitation in the monopoly premium a copyright holder
could charge. Pankaj Tandon, Optimal Patents with Compulsory Licensing, 90 J. POL. ECON. 470,
474 (1982). We regulate utilities the same way, holding down prices in exchange for a unlimited
franchise, rather than allowing them to charge whatever the market might bear for a limited length
of time.
This finding needs to be qualified, in that it is derived for process patents rather than copy-
righted works whose economic value lies in satisfying consumer demand rather than reducing pro-
duction cost. Nevertheless, Tandon's result indicates that in theory, if only in theory, regulation akin
to public utility regulation would be the best method of guaranteeing returns to creators, further
blurring the distinction between copyright and property.
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because of the impropriety of assigning property status to copyrighted
work, but because it is simply too difficult. If anything, the absence of
such regulation supports applying the naive property conception to copy-
righted work.
C. The Social Objection, Reconsidered- Universal Service, Civil Rights
Laws
The final objection to treating copyright work as property is that
much copyrighted material is important to the political and social life of
a nation. The particular importance of informing the general public and
educating its children justifies, to some degree, the application of "fair
use" to news and educational uses. More generally, the importance of
communication, design, and art in overall personal and cultural develop-
ment appears to conflict with the vesting of access rights in the hands of
the creators or their designated agents such as publishers or broadcast
networks. Conceiving of copyrighted work as property would seem to
raise a haunting specter of capitalist corporatism over our democracy
and society, at least in the symbolic sense that counting the shopping
days until Christmas seems to degrade the spirit of the occasion.
Whether such appearances reflect social realities or nostalgic senti-
ments is beyond resolution here. The sole issue is whether these appear-
ances inherently justify withholding property status from copyrighted
work. As with the legal and economic objections to regarding copy-
righted information as property, looking to other areas of property law
and regulation suggests that such withholding is not necessary to resolve
social concerns regarding such a designation. Of the many examples that
might be cited, two stand out. First, public utility regulation of the sort
described in the previous section often contains "common carrier" and
"universal service" requirements.87 Common carrier requirements de-
mand that regulated utilities make their services available to all on equal
terms and conditions. For example, a regulated bus, train, or telephone
company has to serve to everyone willing to pay the (regulated) tariff.
Besides ensuring a kind of fairness, such rules ensure that the owners and
operators of these businesses are not able to condition access on the par-
ticular political or cultural opinions of the customers, e.g., that only sup-
porters of policies that benefit the telephone industry can get telephones.
"Universal service" requirements reflect a policy goal that everyone
should be a customer of an industry's services. This goal has been ap-
plied most centrally to access to communications services, primarily
87. ROBERT BRriT HoRwrrz, THE IRONY OF REGULATORY REFORM 13, 132 (1989).
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those provided by the local telephone networks.88 These policies may be
defended on narrow economic grounds, citing "network externalities"
that make a network more valuable the more people subscribe.8 9 How-
ever, they also reflect a decision, apart from the use value of a network,
that full membership in the state and the society requires that one be part
of the communication network and that special policies are needed to
ensure participation by "the poor, the educationally disadvantaged, the
geographically and technologically isolated, and the struggling small
business." 90 Defining universal service in terms of a set of communica-
tions services, measurement criteria, and funding options remains an
open policy issue.91 Nevertheless, universal service policies reflect a kind
of "fair use" or "compulsory license" for access to particular communi-
cations facilities that does not require us to reject the idea that such facil-
ities can be regarded as property. 92
Even more compelling examples are laws seeking to fulfill specific
social and cultural goals by limiting the discretionary use of property.
Civil rights laws supply some leading instances. Under such laws, prop-
erty owners are restricted in their ability to limit access to their property
because they cannot deny retail service, rental tenancy, or employment
on grounds of race or sex.93 Land developers may be required to set
aside some housing for low income families.94 While civil rights restric-
tions reduce the level of freedom and profit a property owner may enjoy,
they do not imply that stores, apartments, businesses, and land should
not be regarded as property.
V. SUPPRESSION OF NON-COMPETING USES
Thinking about copyright in terms of property naturally leads to one
of the less desirable aspects of property-the right of the property owner
to exclude others from the good. This undesirability is not unique to
copyrighted work. The institution of private property allows persons to
keep others from using their land, natural resources, or goods regardless
88. CRITICAL CONNECTIONS, supra note 48, at 253-54.
89. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities Competition, and Compatibility, 75
AM. ECoN. REv. 424 (1985).
90. CRITICAL CONNECTIONS, supra note 48, at 243.
91. ILd. at 253-54.
92. We might also regard public policies that guarantee free or subsidized access to cultural
facilities such as libraries, museums, and schools a kind of "fair use" idea. In such cases, funding by
and large is provided by public tax revenues, and the relevant property may be publicly owned or
donated by private parties. However, the policies and actions that make these facilities available do
not force us to conclude that books, paintings, and classrooms should not be considered as property.
93. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000b, 2000e (1988).
94. RABIN & KwALI, supra note 80, at 657-58; 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604 (Supp. 1992).
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of the wealth of the former and the property with the latter. Still, copy-
righted works raise special questions for at least four reasons:
(1) Public goods: Since anyone can use copyrighted works without
exhausting any resources, restricting access has a prima facie air of
petulance.
(2) The First Amendment: Restricting the dissemination of copy-
righted work conflicts with the values of open debate among an informed
public. 5
(3) Unintended Uses: Where the creator of a copyrighted work is
able to keep others from using the work in ways he had no intention of
pursuing, the presumably desirable use of the work is absolutely reduced.
There is no compensating economic reward to the creator from this re-
duction, suggesting that there is no added incentive to create that would
compensate for this reduction in desirable uses.96 This is particularly
true of an author's right to suppress unpublished work for which publica-
tion was unintended, 97 even if the author would have been credited.98
(4) Common practices: A number of practices involving copy-
righted works, such as parody 99 and criticism,100 are thought desirable
but would seem ripe for suppression if full property rights were extended
to copyrighted works.
Having discussed political and economic constraints on ordinary
property, the next step in assessing the property status of copyrighted
material requires discussion of the problems presented by suppression
that threaten unintended uses and common practices.
A. Allowing the Suppression of Unintended Uses-An Economic
Approach
If allowing copyright holders to treat their work as property is disa-
greeable, by definition, the less of that the better. The "uneasy case" for
95. Wendy Gordon has referred to the ability of a copyright holder to deny access as "private
censorship." Gordon, Jurisprudence of Benefit supra note 17, at 1011.
96. "The theory behind the copyright laws is that creation will be discouraged if demand can be
undercut by copiers. Where the copy does not compete in anyway with the original, this concern is
absent." Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1051
(2d Cir. 1983) (court vacated a preliminary injunction prohibiting advertising of vacuum cleaner
rating in Consumer Reports), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984); Life Music, Inc. v. Wonderland
Music Co., 241 F. Supp. 653 (1965) (denying preliminary injunction to halt alleged infringement by
the song "Supercalafajalistickespeealadojus" of the song "Supercalifragilisticexpiaidocious").
97. William M. Landes, Copyright Protection of Letters, Diaries, and Other Unpublished Works.
An Economic Approach, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 79, 91 (1992).
98. Landes calls this a "reproductive use." Mda at 104.
99. Richard A. Posner, When is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1992).
100. Id. at 69-70; Gordon, Jurisprudence of Benefits supra note 17, at 1042-43.
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copyright is that such control is permissible only to the extent that it
provides an incentive to spend one's time, energy, and money to produce
copyable work of value. This ex ante perspective implies that the effect
of the bargain on the potential creator extends only as far as reasonably
foreseeable gains. Consequently, it might be argued, we ought not extend
copyright beyond the uses from which the creator intended to earn re-
wards, as perceived at the time the creator made her commitments to
devote effort and resources to creating. This has two potential
implications:
(1) Granting copyright control over unforeseen uses that develop
later provides nothing more than windfall profits to the creator while at
the same time raising the price to those who might have made use of the
work in unforeseen ways; and
(2) Granting control over unintended uses produces a power akin to
private censorship.
To the extent that copyright is regarded as property, these two pos-
sibilities would argue against treating copyrighted work as property. The
soundness of such an argument depends upon whether these two pos-
sibilities lead to deleterious consequences, and whether there is a worka-
ble way to limit the scope of copyright to mitigate these consequences.
1. Are Scope Restrictions Workable?
Let us turn first to the workability question. We can identify ex ante
and ex post methods for limiting the scope of copyright, where the timing
is relative to the acquisition of the copyright grant. The ex ante method
would require that an application for a copyright should specify the crea-
tor's intentions regarding use. For example, a writer of a novel could
specify that she wants to retain copyright over the story to apply to writ-
ten reproduction, theatrical and film reproduction, audio taping, and tel-
evision serialization. If, at a later date, an unforeseen use were to
appear-the "virtual reality" home game, for example-that user would
be able to adapt the work to that use without compensation. The ex post
method would require that the issue of whether the creator intended the
use or not could be resolved by litigation over infringement (or settle-
ment in its expectation).
The apparent difference between the two methods is that the ex ante
procedure substitutes specification up-front for litigation after the fact.
In practice, however, the two methods would likely converge. Under the
ex ante method, one might still expect litigation to resolve whether the
description of intended uses accurately portrayed either the creator's in-
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tentions or the use in question. Under the ex post method, one might
expect legally compelling procedures to evolve whereby creators could
establish evidence of intent in order to deter some potential future litiga-
tion. Be it by ex ante, ex post, or some procedure in between, any effort
to condition copyright on foreseen, intended uses is likely to be very
costly to implement. In the short run, the copyright bar would have the
most to gain. In the long run, talent will be used for copyright contract
writing or litigation that might have been more productively used else-
where in society.
The legal policy question is whether these associated costs are worth
the benefits. One might argue that the expectation of lost revenue from
unforeseen uses might discourage production of copyrighted works.
While it appears contradictory to speak of expected revenues from un-
foreseen uses, there may be a rational positive expectation of such reve-
nues even if no specific use is foreseen. This leads to the problem of
defining "uses" and "unforeseen" with specificity. With limited excep-
tions, someone who produces music for a recording cannot know who
would purchase the recording. If we were to define "use" as "listening to
the recording by Mr. X," such use might conceivably be regarded as "un-
foreseen." The obvious response is that unless Mr. X's use may be un-
foreseen with certainty, there is some positive probability that he will
purchase the recording. However, then it must be determined how im-
probable a use would be before it qualifies as unforeseen. One chance in
a hundred? A thousand? A million?
More fundamentally, even if the uses are unforeseen and unintended
at the time a creator is considering whether to commit effort and re-
sources to produce a copyrightable work, the added costs of specifying
uses and potential litigation will be quite foreseeable. Apart from any
argument that there may be expected revenues from unforeseen uses,
conditioning copyright enforcement on uses will raise the cost of creating
copyrighted work. Contrary to the spirit of the proposal, this predictably
would reduce the supply below current levels. 101
101. This may or may not be a bad thing, in that there may be too many copyrighted works
produced under current law. The reason, essentially, is that the gains to a producer of a particular
copyrighted work come in part from a transfer of profits from existing copyright holders toward his
work. These are not net gains to society at large. Consequently, the actual net gains in terms of
profits to the copyright holder net of these transfers and benefits to users may be less than the
opportunity cost of the effort and the resources used to produce the copyrighted work. For a general
argument of the possibilities in terms of the theory of imperfect competition, see Timothy J. Bren-
nan, Entry and Welfare Loss in Regulated Industries, in COMPETITION AND THE REGULATION OF
UTIITIES 141, 147 (Michael Crew ed., 1992); N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael Whinston, Free Entry
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2. Foreseen but Unintended Uses
A further difficulty with this possibility is that some uses may be
foreseen but not intended by the copyright holder. Two categories of
such uses come to mind. The first, perhaps more benign category, in-
volves uses that others can undertake more efficiently than the copyright
holder.10 2 While interest in a film version of this Article is unlikely, if
there were, surely neither I nor the Chicago-Kent Law Review have any
intention of producing the film. However, ensuring that the film would
be made by the producer with the most appropriate skills and facilities
requires that the copyright holder be able to grant an exclusive license
through auction or negotiation. Unambiguity of control would reduce
the transaction costs associated with getting the film rights in the hands
of the most able producer. Perhaps more importantly, the incentive for
any one producer to develop the film would be hampered if others could
"free ride" on his marketing efforts.10 3
The second category of foreseen but unintended uses involves those
in which the copyright holder specifically intends that some uses of the
work are not made. In some cases, the copyright holder's interests are
not protected;1°4 in others, the opposite holds. In Pacific and Southern
Co., the courts found that "[tihe fact that [the copyright holder] does not
and Social Efficiency, 17 RAND J. ECON. 48 (1986); Marius Schwartz, Investments in Oligopoly:
Welfare Effects and the Teses for Predation, 41 OXFORD ECON. PAP. 698 (1989).
A full economic evaluation of copyright policy is impossible because the complexity of the
competitive interaction and demand substitutions among copyrighted works is beyond the capability
of economic theory or data to generate cost-benefit analyses. As a practical matter, economic analy-
sis of specific copyright-related policies needs to be based on a "stand-alone" analysis that presumes
either that the rest of copyright policy is approximately efficient or, at least, that general failures in
copyright should not be addressed indirectly by policies with other primary intentions. In particu-
lar, conditioning infringement on the nature of use should not be supported because there may be too
many works. If we believe there are too many copyrighted works, the copyright law as an entirety
should be adjusted. Responding to this belief by limiting the scope of copyright for only those works
where foreseeability of particular issues is an issue is likely to be a partial solution, at best.
102. The economic term for this would be "diseconomies of scope," meaning that two products
(e.g., an article and a film) can be produced at lower costs by separate article writers and movie
producers than by a single person or firm attempting to do both.
103. The recent spate of "Amy Fisher" made-for-television movies notwithstanding, arguments
of this sort characterize the literature on "vertical restraints" between manufacturers and distribu-
tors. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 177 (1988).
104. See Dow Jones & Co. v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 546 F. Supp. 113, 121-22 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (no intention to start futures markets based on its stock indices); Consumers Union of the
United States v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir. 1983) cerL denied, 469 U.S. 823
(1984) (no intention to make product ratings available to advertisers). In bath cases, the federal
courts found that there was no harm to the market value of the relevant copyrights. With regard to
Dow Jones' futures markets, the Illinois Supreme Court found misappropriation but no harm to
Dow Jones. Board of Trade of Chicago v. Dow Jones & Co., 456 N.E.2d 84 (1983). Even in its
decision generally supporting Dow Jones, the Illinois Supreme Court acknowledged that it was "cir-
cular" to base a copyright claim on a finding of misappropriation, since characterizing a use as
"misappropriation" depends upon the legitimacy of the copyright claim in the first place. Id at 89.
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actively market copies of the news programs does not matter .... ,,105 In
Salinger, the courts were at least as reluctant to attempt to condition
copyright on intention. In assessing the merits of J. D. Salinger's copy-
right claim over his unpublished letters, Judge Newman wrote:
[T]he need to assess the effect on the market for Salinger's letters is not
lessened by the fact that their author has disavowed any intention to
publish them during his lifetime. First, the proper inquiry concerns
the "potential market" for the copyrighted work .... Second, Salinger
has the right to change his mind. He is entitled to protect his opportu-
nity to sell his letters, an opportunity estimated by his literary agent to
have a current value in excess of $500,000.106
To argue that Salinger should not be allowed to copyright his letter to
protect only his privacy interests grants primacy to economic claims over
personhood or autonomy claims. Granting such primacy to economic
interests runs counter to the idea that copyrighted work ought not be
regarded as property in the first place.107 Moreover, the threat that
copyright would not protect creations from being used in foreseen but
unintended ways could discourage creative effort.108
105. Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1496 (1984), cerL denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985).
106. Salinger v. Random House, 811 F.2d 90, 99 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987). In Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1013 (1978), the court rejected defendant's claim that use of plaintiff's parents' letters in an
account of the parents' trial was "fair use." In support of its holding, the court relied on Folsem v.
March:
What descendant or representative of the deceased author would undertake to publish at
his own risk or expense, any such papers; and what editor would be willing to employ his
own learning and judgment, and researches, in illustrating such work, if the moment they
were successful, and possessed the substantial patronage of the public, a rival bookmaker
might republish them, either in the same, or in a cheaper form, and thus either share with
him, or take from him the whole profits.
Id. at 1070 (quoting Folsom v. March, 9 F. Cas. 342, 347 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901)).
107. A similar claim underlies an argument by Yen that the fair use treatment of parody appro-
priately shows that the economic theory of property does not explain copyright law in its detail.
Alfred C. Yen, When Authors Won't Sell: Parody, Fair Use, and Efficiency in Copyright Law, 62 U.
COLO. L. REv. 79, 82 (1991). Yen's specific argument is that a parody inflicts on the original creator
a loss of emotional tranquility tantamount to the loss of limb. Id at 103. Consequently, authors
would never agree to sell parody rights. Hence the fact that parody is permitted shows that effi-
ciency does not and should not determine copyright law. Parody "fair use" determinations essen-
tially ignore nonpecuniary harm to the author. Id. at 102.
This argument presents a number of difficulties. (1) If it were the case that parody inflicted
harm on original creators equivalent to the loss of a limb, then allowing its fair use would hardly be
proper. It would be unconscionable. According to Yen, the very virtue of this policy is that it allows
parodists to inflict incalculable losses on originators. (2) Harm from parody tantamount to the loss
of a limb would violate the personhood and autonomy that underlies the Lockean account of copy-
right that Yen favors. (3) If authors regarded parody so negatively, they would be dissuaded from
creating works that lend themselves to predictable parody. That such works are created indicates
that parody is not regarded with extreme trepidation, contradicting the empirical assumption on
which Yen bases his attack.
We might add that on the Lockean account, a parody is an extension of both the originator and
the parodists, raising the difficulties mentioned in the text accompanying notes 63-64.
108. Pacific & S. Co., 744 F.2d at 1497.
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Establishing a distinction between economic and non-economic
claims may be difficult in any event. In the first instance, a copyright
holder faced with loss of copyright could claim an intention to make
economic gains. Salinger could say he planned to use the letters in his
memoirs; Dow Jones could say that it planned to license use of its stock
indexes in futures markets. Even where intention is lacking there may be
economic harm: for example, Consumer Reports' publisher could argue
that allowing sellers of consumer goods to profit from advertising its
product rating might enhance suspicions that its reviews were prejudiced
by under-the-table payments.10 9 Similarly, Dow Jones, Inc. may have a
valid claim that the way in which it calculates its index might be suscep-
tible to corruption if millions of dollars were being wagered on its future
level. Richard Posner raises the example of the tee-shirts featuring the
words "I Like Cocaine" written in an imitation of the copyrighted "I
Like Coke" logo;110 Coca-Cola, Inc. might be able to claim economic
harm from negative publicity.
There are a number of property-related policy options for dealing
with these losses, pecuniary or otherwise. The "property law" solution
would be to extend copyright to situations where these losses can be
shown. The "liability law" solution would be to treat such losses as po-
tential torts, without particular reference to copyright. " The simplest
solution, however, might simply be to presume in the first place that such
uses are covered under the copyright. As such, the burden of enumerat-
ing uses perhaps should be borne by the side that specifies what would
not be covered, rather than what is-as we have under the "fair use"
doctrine. The theoretical advantage of granting the presumption of use
rights, whether foreseen, intended, or neither, is that any potential user
could negotiate with the copyright for the right to use. If the "Coase
theorem" holds, the license will be granted if the gains to the user exceed
the costs to the copyright holder, whether these gains are monetary or
otherwise. 112
109. The court found that this harm, while possible, was not a harm to present copyrights, and
hence would not exclude a "fair use" defense of the use of Consumer Reports ratings in advertise-
ments. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d 1044, 1051
(2d Cir. 1983). cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984).
110. Posner, supra note 99, at 74-76.
11. One might think of these as the front and back of the "cathedral," as in the title of Guido
Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral, 85 HAv. L. REv. 1089 (1972). Copyright law recognizes this approach, to some
extent. "When, as here, (the works in issue were not in active competition with each other] the court
may require some showing of possible irreparable injury, although it is probably an abuse of discre-
tion to require detailed proof of the danger or irreparable harm." Life Music, Inc. v. Wonderland
Music Co., 241 F. Supp. 653, 657 (1965) (citation omitted).
112. Landes argues that the presumption that efficiency requires the copyright holder to have the
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The copyright holder's control over criticism as a use is particularly
problematic. Gordon finds that the Coasian bargain for critical uses is
tilted inappropriately in favor of the copyright holder.' 13 She argues that
the fees critics would pay understate the value of criticism to both read-
ers and creators of other competing works. This understatement arises
partly because criticism is itself a public good that cannot easily be priced
in such a way to capture its different values to different readers.'" 4 How-
ever, problems of this sort can affect the copyright holder's side of this
bargain as well. For just the same reasons, the losses to the copyright
holder as a result of criticism may understate the losses to the users-
particularly if the criticism is unjustified-and the losses to sellers of
complementary products who lose business as a result of the criticism.115
Moreover, the demand from noncritical licensees of the copyrighted
work can also undervalue its value to its customers, e.g., the film and
video rights to a book. If this is insufficient reason for granting fair use
rights to such uses, we perhaps should hesitate to grant fair use rights to
critical uses on similar grounds.
Finally, there remains one additional problem with banning the ap-
plication of copyright to unintended uses. It may well be that before a
particular time some set of uses for a copyrighted work might be unenvi-
sioned, e.g., video tape. companions to cookbooks. Cookbooks written
prior to this time could be freely used under the "intentional uses" re-
quirement for copyright. After such uses became apparent, probably
from the time someone put out a video version of a pre-existing cook-
right may be mistaken, at least in the case of the use of "productive uses" of unpublished works. A
"productive use" is defined as one that "incorporates the work it copies into a new work," this is
distinguished from "reproductive uses" that merely reproduce the works. Landes, supra note 97, at
87. Landes claims that there will be few potential "productive users" e.g., biographers of Salinger,
thus making the transaction costs (as opposed to the payoff costs) low for Salinger to pay these
biographers not to use his letters. Ide at 106-07.
This may or may not be true for a biography, but it hardly seems true for all potential "produc-
tive uses," eg., performances of songs. The example of song performances suggests that the line
between productive and unproductive uses seems rather vague, giving another reason to grant the
variety of use rights to the copyright holder. Finally, while the costs may berelatively low for a
copyright holder to negotiate with this handful of potential productive users, no argument is given
suggesting that they would be lower than the costs associated with granting all rights initially to the
copyright holder.
113. Gordon, Jurisprudence of Benefits, supra note 17, at 1042-43.
114. Id. For a more extensive treatment, including references to the public goods problem and
the possibility that managers of firms that might pay for criticism might not act in a value-maximiz-
ing manner, see Gordon, Right Not to Use, supra note 17, at 60-70.
115. Losses to sellers of complementary products as the result of criticism are the flip side of the
coin that sellers of substitute products gain as a result of criticism. Gordon, Jurisprudence of Bene-
fi supra note 17, at 1043, also discusses "income effects," in that the critic's gains might exceed the
copyright holder's losses only if the former has a use right. That may be, but this is not an efficiency
issue. It may be that as a matter of distributive justice we might want systematically to make critics
wealthier and creators poorer, although no justification is apparent.
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book, subsequent cookbook writers would specify the video tape inten-
tion as part of their copyright. If so, this would create a bias in the
market, favoring old cookbooks on video tape over new ones. Under
some circumstances, this may lead to an aggregate inefficiency. The
gains from having the old books available at marginal cost on video tape
can be outweighed by the reduction in demand for the new books on
video that sell at a premium above marginal cost. 116
B. Criticism and the Rawlsian Contract-A Philosophical Response
The implication from economic theory supporting broad use control
over copyright holders would seem to call the property analogy into
question, since this would seem to allow creators to control critical uses
of works.' 17 One apparent place to turn might be the classical theory of
property that we found somewhat problematic. However, regarding
copyrighted work in the Lockean terms of being owned by virtue of being
an extension of the sel'I only lends further support to the presumption
that broad control should be vested in the creator.
Philosophical constructions from the contractualist perspective may
be of use.119 Imagine a hypothetical contract among authors and critics
in a pre-social situation prior to the institution of literature in which the
bargaining individuals do not know which author or critic they will be,
or even whether they would be an author or a critic. 120 Then, suppose
these parties are charged with the task of designing the rules for critical
access to copyrighted work. If the authors and critics are not unduly
averse to risk, this thought experiment should lead each to choose the
most valuable overall system.
What might they choose? It is plausible that authors as a whole
116. This is an example of the "theory of the second best," in which the optimal response to a
price in excess of marginal cost (the new books) is to have prices above marginal cost to some extent
for substitutes as well (the old books). For a useful description of the theory, see F.M. SCHERER,
INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 548-50 (1970).
117. If criticism were to be regarded as a derivative work, copyright control might even extend
to criticism that does not quote the work verbatim.
118. Gordon, Jurisprudence of Benefit supra note 17, at 1039, and references cited therein (dis-
cussing of "author's rights" in a Lockean framework). There is some evidence that the courts have
rejected the Lockean perspective. In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. CL 1282,
1290 (1991), the Supreme Court said that "[tihe primary objective.., is not to reward the labor of
authors .... " See also Yen, supra note 107 (discussing Yen's analysis of parody).
119. See examples cited supra note 21; see also T.M. Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitariana-
ism, in UTILInTAAISM AND BEYOND 103, 110 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982).
120. Rawls calls this pre-social situation the "original position," with the lack of knowledge as
being behind the "veil of ignorance." RAWLs, supra note 21, at 138-39. Landes appeals to the "veil
of ignorance" in explaining why authors as a group would prefer a regime in which "productive




would find their enterprise most valuable if critics as a whole were al-
lowed to excerpt their works for purposes of explaining it to readers and
informing them of their value. The overall value of the literary enterprise
to readers, hence to writers, would be more valuable with open criticism,
even if in some cases some authors would be worse off if criticism were
allowed.1 21 The confidence of readers in the independent validity of criti-
cism would be reduced if it were generally known that authors could
decide who got to quote their work critically, because readers would pre-
sume that only favorable criticism would be so favored.122
VI. EFFICIENCY INTERPRETATIONS OF THE COPYRIGHT
RESTRICTIONS
The discussion so far has shown that general considerations that
warrant limiting the scope of copyright may warrant similar limitations
of more conventional property rights. This would support the conclu-
sion that copyrighted work could be regarded as property, subject to the
public interest restrictions on exclusion and alienability that are imposed
on naive property. The last piece of the puzzle requires that the particu-
lar restrictions embodied in the copyright law can be supported in a man-
ner consistent with the theory that supports property, with the focus on
copyrightability and fair use.123
A. Copyrightability
One of the leading tenets of the instrumental, economic justification
for property is that, in Posner's terms, property should be "universal."
As he puts it, "[i]deally, all resources should be owned, or ownable, by
someone, except resources so plentiful that everybody can consume as
much of them as he wants without reducing consumption by anyone else
."124 Rubin adds the qualification that property rights ought not be
121. In Rawls's theory, each person is choosing not just a literary system but the entire society
and their entire life's wealth and path. Rawls implicitly argues that in such a hypothetical situation
when one's entire fate is at stake, each person would be maximally averse to risk, and thus would
choose institutions that maximize the welfare of the least well-off person. RAWLS, supra note 21, at
302-03.
122. Brennan, supra note 11, at 382. For subsequent related arguments, see William M. Landes
& Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 359 (1989);
Posner, supra note 99, at 74.
123. Timing might be added to the list, but under current law there is virtually no effective
attenuation of the property right, under reasonable discount rates reflecting the economic risk associ-
ated with the development of copyrighted work. See Breyer, supra note 40; see also Landes & Pos-
ner, supra note 122, at 363.
124. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, in ECoNOMic FOUNDATIONS, supra note 22,
at 13. An interesting contrast involves proposed restrictions of the ability of creators to cede irrevo-
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defined past "the point where enforcement of title is more expensive than
the value of ownership." 125 This sends contradictory signals with regard
to copyrightability. The initial part suggests that copyright ought to be
imposed so the advantages of market exchange can be extended to ex-
pressions. On the other hand, the (economist's) public good characteris-
tics of copyrighted work suggest that one can consume as much as one
wants without taking from anyone else. This argues against conveying
property status through copyright.
In a later work, Posner and Landes accept the conclusion that copy-
right could be granted where the advantages of market exchange exceed,
essentially, the sum of the costs of charging a positive price for a public
good and the cost of enforcing the copyright. 126 This perspective pro-
vides a method of evaluating copyrightability issues within the economic
justification for property. The copyright distinction between facts or
ideas and expressions127 is important here.
At first glance, the property perspective implies that the "idea/ex-
pression" distinction may not be the right place to draw the "copyright-
ability" line.128 As the Second Circuit decision in Harper & Row
illustrated, the distinction between fact and expression may become ex-
ceedingly speculative and metaphysical. 129 In that case, the issue was
whether excerpts from Gerald Ford's memoirs involving his pardon of
Richard Nixon could be reproduced by The Nation. In deciding against
the publisher of President Ford's memoirs, the Harper & Row majority
claimed that Ford's statements were factual representations of his state
of mind.1 30 The dissenting judge argued that these facts did not exist
apart from Ford's expression and were copyrightable.
131
cable reactive control, e.g., "moral rights" in copyright. See Brennan, Rights as Inalienable, supra
note 71, at 19-20; Kohs, supra note 73.
125. Rubin, supra note 76, at 208.
126. Landes & Posner, supra note 122, at 326.
127. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1992); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
128. Landes and Posner argue for the distinction for four reasons: (1) economic welfare is
greater the more suppliers of ideas there are; (2) future authors use ideas developed earlier, (3)
copyrighting facts/ideas would lead to rent seeking; and (4) administrative costs are difficult in
defining "rights in ideas." See Landes & Posner, supra note 122, at 348-49. However, the first three
reasons apply equally well to expressions. If facts or ideas are as valuable, if not more valuable than
expression, there is as much reason to assign copyright to provide an incentive to discover facts and
develop ideas as there is to promote expressions. As discussed infra, the justification for the differing
treatment of facts and ideas from expressions in copyright hinges on the fourth of Landes & Posner's
reasons. See infra text accompanying notes 132-34.
129. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 471
U.S. 539 (1985).




The subsequent Supreme Court decision suggested a different ra-
tionale for the distinction. Justice O'Connor, writing the opinion that
reversed this decision, argued that the test for copyrightability should be
the presence of "originality," which Ford's book passed. 132 To genera-
lize, the relevant test should be whether the work at issue is attributable
to a creator. 133 On this account, the distinction between the copyright
treatment of facts and expressions is that the former generally may be
difficult to attribute while the latter may be relatively easy to assign. Un-
derstanding the difference as one of ease of attribution or, in Justice
O'Connor's terms, the presence of originality, weakens the qualitative
distinction that might argue against treating copyrighted information
like property. 134
B. Fair Use
Fair use is nothing more than a zero-price compulsory license of
copyrighted works for particular uses. From the perspective of the eco-
nomic theory of property, such a license seems to preempt the market
forces and negotiations that should tell us whether it is efficient to make
the work available at a zero price. 135 However, markets and negotiations
can be costly, explaining why private parties allocate some transactions
outside markets. 136 More important in this context, these considerations
can rationalize the allocation of property rights and the existence of "de-
fault" procedures in the law such as commercial codes, corporate organi-
zation, and bankruptcy. Such considerations can rationalize fair use as
well, to the extent that it defines uses for which transaction costs are high
and the expected negotiated price would be close to zero. ' 37 An analogy
132. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985).
133. Brennan, supra note 11, at 377. For a statement of the necessity that copyrightable works
must possess "more than a minimal or trivial amount of originality," see Moore Publishing, Inc. v.
Big Sky Marketing, Inc., 756 F. Supp. 1371, 1380 (D. Idaho 1991).
134. The concept of "treasure trove" in property law refers to that "which was hidden so long
ago that it would appear that no one with superior title to the property intends to reclaim it or can be
found." REAL PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 49. While this is tied to the idea of loss, it is a concept
of property law consistent with a deference to allowing anyone to use facts or ideas, to the extent
that these are generically the types of information for which "no one with superior title.. . can be
found."
In what might be interpreted as another use of the "treasure trove" idea, Landes and Posner
discuss what they call a "tracing problem" in arguing for a limitation on the term of copyright.
Landes & Posner, supra note 122, at 361-62.
135. Besen et al., supra note 70.
136. R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Kirm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) is the lead article, but
research into institutional organization springing from that work did not begin until the mid-1970s.
For a recent survey, see Bengt R. Holstrom & Jean Tirole, The Theory of the Firm, in 1 HANDBOOK
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 61 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
137. Brennan, supra note 11, at 382. See also Landes & Posner, supra note 122, at 357-58;
Posner, supra note 97, at 69.
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to fair use in property law might be an easement created by zoning or
other property regulation. 138
From an economic perspective, the primary test for whether a use
would be "fair use" would be whether such use reduced the optimal
profit opportunities to the copyright holder. Tests based on the nature of
the work and the substantiality of the used material would be subsumed
under this. The purpose-based justifications, e.g., news, education, and
criticism, can provide independent justification by appealing to externali-
ties (e.g., third-party benefits) or non-efficiency considerations, 139 per-
haps as established by a hypothetical contract. 14°  As with
copyrightability, however, appeals to such justifications need not imply
that copyrighted work is not property. Society employs a variety of tax
and subsidy programs to support news (second-class mail subsidies) and
education (publicly supported, freely available schools) without threat to
the breadth of property. Even criticism is supported to some extent
through public grants to academics. More to the point, contractualist
arguments cited above to allow critical uses of copyrighted works may be
employed to justify any number of social and redistributive policies 141
which do not necessarily conflict with the idea of private ownership.142
VII. CONCLUSION
Copyright appears to conflict with naive property theory in its con-
stitutional and statutory. origins, its limitations of scope, fair use, and
public good characteristics, and its effect on political processes and cul-
tural development. These distinctions, however, may be regarded as an
outgrowth of unease with property generally. While property may be
defended as a means to protect personhood, a more contemporary de-
138. An interesting issue is if and when fair use could constitute a "taking" as defined by prop-
erty law. RP.AL PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 44. If insignificant loss of profits is taken to be a
necessary condition for a fair use, no compensation may be necessary (unless the "fair use" causes
other injury). On the other hand, where there are losses, the fair use may be socially beneficial but it
need not be just or eficient for the copyright holder to bear the costs. This policy has been suggested
in First Amendment contexts, in which Mr. A injured by Mr. B's speech could deserve compensa-
tion from the state, while preserving Mr. B's right to speak. Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free
Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321 (1992).
139. 'The [fair use] doctrine offers a means of balancing the exclusive right of a copyright holder
with the public's interest in dissemination of information affecting areas of universal concern, such as
art, science, history, or industry." Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F. 2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977), cert
denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). Perhaps not surprisingly, advocates for The Nation view the primacy
given to economic criteria in determining "fair use" as regrettable. Leon Friedman, Purloined Let-
ter, 255 THE NATION 797 (1992) (commenting on a judgment that Harper's Magazine infringed a
professor's copyright by reproducing half of a letter he sent to students to recruit them to his course).
140. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
141. Scanlon, supra note 119, at 112.
142. See, eg., Dworkin, supra note 55, at 285.
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fense may be to rationalize it as a means to the end of permitting mutu-
ally agreeable, efficient exchange. Yet naive property, even with this
general defense, can be subject to restrictions similar in character to
those found in copyright, reflecting similar legal, economic, and social
values.
The broad right to suppress found in copyright raises particular con-
cerns regarding censorship, the right to criticize, and the need to grant
creators economic claims on unforeseen uses. The economic outlook
tends to support such a broad right, but a contractualist perspective may
support exemptions for certain uses, particularly the right to criticize.
The final test of the property outlook is that its justifying theories are
consistent with standards for copyrightability and fair use. In conclu-
sion, as long as the word "property" is not inappropriately used to imply
that use and exclusion restrictions are never permissible, there is no com-
pelling reason to force copyright and property into separate philosophi-
cal, economic, and legal realms.
